Abstract: This paper proposes to combine supplier-side and purchaser-side logic in a new model of Japanese industrial districts. We interviewed large retail firms that were purchasers for industrial districts and 21 small-scale firms located in Tokyo's Ota Ward and Joto area that were the suppliers. Our interviews clearly highlighted the importance of business practices called "Kouza" and "Chouai." Large enterprises on the purchaser side deal only with kouza-holding firms (direct suppliers) and chouai-saki, which coordinate sub-suppliers. The assumption of such business practices implies that firms holding kouza within the industrial district are a necessity for purchasers to enjoy economies of agglomeration.
Introduction
There are two strains of theory that explain industrial districts: the Weber strain uses location theory to explain the mechanisms behind the formation of industrial districts, and the Marshall strain uses small-business theory to explain the mechanisms behind the functioning and continued existence of industrial districts (Inamizu, Wakabayashi & Takahashi, 2007; Matsubara, 1999; Sumiya, 1971; Yamamoto, 2005) (Aoki, 1960; Fujikawa, 1999; Hoover, 1937; Itoh, 1970) (Hoover, 1937; Isard, 1956) , external economies also include those gained by multiple firms through direct interaction with each other. Year attention for their possible contributions to increasing the competitive advantages of firms located in them (e.g., Porter, 1990; Porter, 1998) . In Japan in particular, as shown in Fig. 1 even when accounting for biases of search systems, 2 it is a fact that literature on industrial districts has increased rapidly since the latter half of the 1990s. Amid a lengthy economic downturn, there were lively movements attempting to revitalize regional economies by creating industrial districts across Japan (e.g., Matsushima, 1998; Ogawa, 1998; Ohashi, 2000) and lively discussion on transferring technology from universities to regional industrial clusters (e.g., Ishikura, Fujita, Maeda, Kanai, & Yamazaki, 2003) .
This timing may have led to research in Japanese industrial district theory being focused on the Jonan district of Tokyo (Seki & Kato, 1990; Watanabe, 1998; Whittaker, 1997) and the Higashi Osaka district (Ueda, 2000 (Ueda, , 2004a (Ueda, , 2004b . These districts can be seen as leading examples of urban industrial districts in Japan. Research on Okatani in Nagano Prefecture, which features an agglomeration of the precision machinery industry (Seki, Tsujita, 2001 ) and on Tsubame in Niigata Prefecture, a leading example of a rural industrial district (Iga, 2000; Seki, Fukuda, 2 Total number of hits per year generated by the term. The authors conducted a general bibliographic search in the National Diet Library Online Public Access Catalog User Guide (NDL-OPAC) and searches of indices of journal articles, using the keyword sangyo shuseki ("industrial district"). The search was conducted on April 21, 2007. Care is required concerning the general bibliographic search because the number of journals indexed has undergone substantial changes. While 3100 journals were indexed in June 1996, today the number has risen to 9891. In addition, the term sangyo shuseki was almost never used until the 1970s. (2) technical divisibility of production processes, (3) availability of low-cost labor, (4) a social division of labor that makes new entry easy with small amounts of capital, (5) a social division of labor that functions to diversify risks and keep them to minimal levels, (6) massive increase in the benefits of locating in a locality as the external economy's advantages increase during the development of local industries, and (7) adaptability and elasticity of the social division of labor that influence the formation of product structures suited to the times. In particular, he cited Marshall in explaining the external economy as described under characteristic "6."
Accordingly, in this paper, we will identify and classify matters on which there is consensus in Japanese industrial district theory, bearing in mind
Marshall's industrial district theory. Before doing so, we will first define key concepts. In this study, we define industrial districts, according to Marshall (1920) , as the location of a number of small and medium-sized enterprises of the same industry in a certain geographical area. In addition, we define economies of agglomeration, according to Weber (1909) , as cost savings enjoyed from use of an industrial district that are greater than those that could be enjoyed without using the industrial district. Since we are defining industrial districts according to Marshall (1920) , these economies of agglomeration do not include internal economies. Below, we classify the claims of Japanese industrial district theory from the perspective of external economies-in particular, economies arising from the presence of local markets for special skills. As pointed out by Marshall, a precondition for the above responses to be possible is the presence within the industrial district of local markets for special skills. When this precondition is met, even in response to large or high-level jobs that a company cannot handle on its own, the company can procure the skilled labor it needs from local markets for special skills, enabling it to accept orders with confidence that it can meet delivery schedules and fulfill quality expectations. However, it must be noted that skilled labor can be absorbed by firms not just through employment relationships but also through subcontracting relationships. In fact, in order to meet delivery times, firms sometimes hire skilled laborers from outside as immediate reinforcements or they may subcontract work to small firms (Watanabe, 1997 (Watanabe, 1979 (Watanabe, , 1997 . 
Overlooked purchaser-side logic:
Business practices in Japan (2) We also interviewed a person formerly responsible for the administrative system and the person responsible for planning of locally produced since Sumiya (1971) , who focused on the functions of wholesalers in Tokyo's Joto area. These have been referred to by various names, including "system organizers" (Yamazaki, 1977) , chukakugata ("core firms") (Watanabe, 1997) , juyo hannyu kigyo ("demand-input firms") (Itami, 1998) , and "linkage firms" (Takaoka, 1998) . Yoshida (2002) confirmed that kouza-holding firms corresponded to the "core firms" cited by Watanabe (1997) and that kouza-holding firms based on the volume of work subcontracted per company fulfilled the role of Itami's "demand-input firms." products in a large retailer. We interviewed the person formerly responsible for the administrative system for approximately two hours and interviewed both persons together for approximately two hours as well. We asked them primarily about transaction relations with suppliers and about kouza.
Fact findings
The results of these interviews made it clear that by nature large manufacturers and distributors in Japan employ the business practice of dealing directly only with suppliers and subcontractors that have kouza or numbers (i.e., kouza-holding firms), and furthermore that the extent of this business practice is as outlined below:
(1) First, when supplier and subcontractor firms are formally authorized by large enterprises as trading partners, they are registered and assigned supplier numbers. These are kouza. transactions-is highly significant for purposes of business stability. Furthermore, Yoshida (2002) points out the following four points as additional benefits available to kouza-holding firms: (1) the high likelihood of being able to receive orders from large enterprises not limited to existing transactions, (2) the ability to carry out sales activities with easier access to large enterprises, (3) the ability to gain the trust of other small and medium-sized enterprises in the area, and (4) the ability to familiarize themselves with various management methods in areas such as document preparation and quality control. All of these can be considered conducive to securing orders.
Japanese industrial district theory has looked only at the presence or absence of ordering relationships and the distribution of labor within industrial districts, without directly addressing these Japanese business practices of kouza and chouai (Takaoka, 1998) . For this reason, it has left largely untouched the issues of why and how firms in industrial districts receive business orders from outside these districts. In addition, even when focusing on the existence of firms that serve as points of contact between firms inside and outside industrial districts, the theory has not discussed sufficiently the mutual relationships between and roles played by firms inside and outside industrial districts. However, a look at business practices involving kouza-holding firms and chouai-saki makes it possible to summarize these matters as outlined below.
(1) By using kouza-holding firms and chouai-saki that provide guarantees for transactions, large manufacturers and large distributors on the purchaser side may derive the following benefits: (a) they can avoid transaction risks, and (b) they do not need to cover directly costs related to processes such as distribution, administration, and production. 6 It is highly likely that this business practice will continue to persist in the future as well. This is because ISO certification is now taken into consideration by large enterprises in choosing direct trading partners. In fact, according to the survey covered in this paper, since it is unlikely even in areas such as Ota Ward that small firms would have the specialized environmental managers required under ISO 14000, large enterprises have adopted the makeshift approach of dealing directly with suppliers that have attained ISO certification. Further, they require that firms serving as liaisons employ administrative efforts such as document control, as part of their strengthening of governance activities.
Required condition from the purchaser side: A kouza-holding firm must be present within the industrial district.
Furthermore, the following mutually reinforcing relationships exist between these requirements on the supplier and purchaser sides:
(a) Since the presence of local markets for special skills makes it possible to accept orders from purchasers and maintain kouza even for jobs that are relatively large in comparison with their own capabilities, kouza-holding firms will locate in areas with such local markets for special skills.
(b) Since subcontractors located near kouza-holding firms can secure stable work, even if in small quantities, local markets for special skills will form in such areas.
Put another way, the presence of local markets for special skills encourages kouza-holding firms to 
Toward future research
Since the subject of the survey described in this paper is limited, research with a broader subject matter should be conducted in the future. We would like to conclude this paper by proposing three issues that should be verified by such research. work they could not handle alone (Yoshida, 2002 ). In the case of tool-and-die manufacturers, when industry-wide production capacity cannot increase quickly enough in times of rapid demand growth or in order to avoid the risks involved in facilities expansion, manufacturers mutually accommodate excess orders received by outsourcing some work to other tool-and-die manufacturers for specific processing only (Saito, 1994) .
Structure of social division of labor akin to a mountain chain: When one or more purchasers placing relatively stable orders in sufficient quantity is present, a structure similar to the structure of social division of labor like a mountain chain (Watanabe, 1997) 7 will be 7 The structure of social division of labor like a mountain chain is a concept proposed by Watanabe (1985 Watanabe ( , 1997 to describe the structure of division of labor in the Japanese machine industry. Watanabe (1985 Watanabe ( , 1997 depicts the concept of the structure of social division of labor as a mountain chain on a graph, with company size on the vertical axis and market capacity in the machine industry on the horizontal axis. Although likening the structure of the social division of labor to a visible. However, since in general firms can choose locations irrespective of existing industrial districts when there is stable business in large quantities (Watanabe, 1997) , this structure is not unique to industrial districts.
Location of purchasers outside industrial districts:
From the perspective of industrial district mechanisms, purchasers need to be confined to locations within the industrial district when information stickiness as proposed by von Hippel (1994) is strong. When a kouza-holding firm fulfills distribution, production control, and production functions targeted at outside subcontractors in lieu of the purchaser, information stickiness weakens and the purchaser itself can be located outside the industrial mountain chain is itself a concept that covers the Japanese machine industry as a whole, it is thought that similar structures can be seen in industrial districts in other industrial fields as well.
district. To summarize, even if the location for the operations of the large manufacturer serving as the purchaser is the initial impetus for formation of the industrial district (Itami, 1998; Seki & Kato, 1990 
